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PROPOSALS  FOR COORDINATION  of monetary  policy to stabilize  nominal  or 
real exchange rates or for targeting  monetary policy on the nominal 
exchange rate assume, explicitly or implicitly,  that exchange rate fluc- 
tuations are, on balance, harmful to  the world economy and that 
monetary  policy can productively  reduce  the amplitude  of these fluctua- 
tions. The objective of this paper  is to examine  the analytical  basis and 
empirical  evidence for these assumptions.  The conclusion is that both 
hold only some of the time. A coordination  agreement  would therefore 
have to define the circumstances  under  which the assumptions  hold, a 
difficult  task  indeed.  A third  assumption  in current  proposals  for  a formal 
international  conference to implement a coordination agreement-a 
"  new Bretton  Woods '-is  that such an agreement  is at least politically 
feasible. This assumption  too is questionable. Toward the end of the 
paper I will argue that any international  conference held now would 
resemble  the  failed  World  Economic  Conference  of 1933  far  more  closely 
than  it would Bretton  Woods. 
Movements  in  the real  exchange  rate  of the dollar  have  had  substantial 
effects on employment and output in U.S.  manufacturing  industries. 
The elasticity of employment to an appreciation in the real dollar 
exchange  rate  is - 0.14. Thus  a real  60 percent  appreciation  of the dollar 
from 1980  to 1985  would, in itself, have reduced  manufacturing  employ- 
ment  by 8.4 percent, or 1.7 million  jobs. However, even this magnitude 
of job loss is not a net loss to the economy, because the real dollar 
appreciation  was part of an equilibrium  reaction to the shift in the 
structural  budget position in the early 1980s. The real appreciation 
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facilitated  the foreign  financing  of a significant  fraction  of the U. S  . fiscal 
deficit  and domestic investment,  an effect that would have to be set off 
against  the employment  effect in assessing the overall cost or benefit  of 
the dollar  appreciation. 
Movements in the real exchange rate can have their sources in real 
disturbances,  such as a fiscal shift or an oil price change, or in financial 
or monetary  disturbances  that  move the nominal  exchange  rate relative 
to goods  prices.  Monetary  coordination  can  limit  undesirable  fluctuations 
in real exchange rates coming  from the latter, but not the former, type 
of disturbance. 
An example of the limited  effectiveness of monetary  coordination  is 
provided by the appreciation  of the dollar in real terms from 1981 to 
1984.  The real appreciation  was in large  part  an equilibrium  reaction  to 
the fiscal shift  that  began  in 1982  and  was achieved mainly  via a nominal 
appreciation  (see figure 1), as U.S. goods prices moved roughly  in line 
with  foreign  prices.  A monetary  policy that  attempted  to hold  the  nominal 
exchange  rate against  this pressure  would have required  a substantially 
higher  growth  of money-essentially  monetizing  the shift in the deficit. 
The result would presumably  have been higher  inflation  in the United 
States and a real dollar appreciation  through inflation  instead of the 
nominal  exchange rate. In this case it seems preferable  to achieve the 
real  appreciation  by permitting  the nominal  rate  to move. 
The difficulty  of taking  equilibrium  movements  of real  exchange  rates 
into account  in an agreement  on monetary  coordination  is compounded 
by the fact that there is no analytical consensus on the causes of 
fluctuations  in the equilibrium  real exchange rate. For example, the 
relationship  of the post-1981  shift in the U.S. structural  fiscal deficit  to 
the real appreciation  of the dollar is a matter  of dispute. My analysis 
below follows a crowding-out  line that requires  the trade  balance  to do 
its share  to make  room  in full-employment  gross national  product  for the 
shift  in the budget.  This  position  is attacked  from  one side  by Keynesians 
who argue  that the real appreciation  was due to tight money and from 
the other side by monetarists  who argue that there is no relationship 
between shifts in the budget  position and the real exchange rate. With 
this  range  of disagreement  on economic  analysis,  how are  the negotiators 
to reach agreement?  The topic is one for the National Science Founda- 
tion, not a new Bretton  Woods. 
The main part of this paper  provides the evidence and analysis that William H. Branson  177 
Figure 1.  Nominal and Real Effective Dollar Exchange Rates,  1979:1-1985:4a 
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Sources:  Author's  calculations,  based  on  data  from  Economic  Report  of  the  President,  February  1986, table 
B-105,  and earlier issues. 
a.  Quarterly data.  The  nominal exchange  rate is  based  on  the  Federal  Reserve  series  for the  weighted  average 
nominal exchange  value of the U.S.  dollar against the currencies  of the Group of Ten industrial countries.  Real rate 
is  adjusted for changes  in the consumer  price index.  A rise in either index  is  an appreciation  of the dollar against 
foreign currencies. 
support  the argument  just presented. First, I estimate the effects of 
fluctuation  in the real  exchange  rate  of the dollar  on U. S. nonagricultural 
employment  and summarize  the relation  of movements  in nominal  and 
real  exchange  rates. Then I present  the analysis  of the effect of a shift  in 
the fiscal  deficit  on the equilibrium  real  exchange  rate. Finally,  I explore 
the analog  between the "new Bretton  Woods" and 1933. 178  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
The Real Exchange Rate and Employment 
In a recent paper coauthored  with James P. Love, I report results 
from  an empirical  study of the effects of fluctuations  in the dollar's  real 
exchange  rate  on employment  and  output  in manufacturing  industries  in 
the United States.1 These effects are presumably  a major source of 
unhappiness  with the movement of the dollar, concern about its "mis- 
alignment,"  and pressure to stabilize it. The employment  findings  are 
summarized  by industry  and by state in the appendix.  Here I show the 
results  for all nonagricultural  employment. 
The  estimates  of an  equation  explaining  fluctuations  in  nonagricultural 
employment  from 1963  to 1985  are shown in table 1. The real exchange 
rate  coefficients  in the table show the elasticity  of employment  by sector 
to movements in the real exchange rate. Employment in the mining 
sector is most responsive to movements  in the dollar,  with an elasticity 
of  -0.387.  Durable manufacturing  is  second, with an elasticity of 
- 0.206. All manufacturing  has a highly  significant  elasticity of - 0.140, 
mentioned earlier. Transportation  and public utilities, wholesale and 
retail trade, finance and real estate, and service all have insignificant 
coefficients. Government  employment  shows a significant  elasticity of 
-  0.165, a decrease in government employment coinciding with the 
appreciation  of the dollar. 
The results in the Branson  and Love study, summarized  here and in 
the appendix,  are consistent with the hypothesis that  fluctuations  in the 
real  exchange  rate  have serious  effects on employment  in  manufacturing, 
particularly  on the durable  goods producers. 
Real and Nominal Exchange Rates 
With nominal exchange rates moving flexibly relative to sluggish 
goods prices, movements in the real exchange rate are dominated  by 
movements in the nominal rate. Jacob Frenkel has documented this 
relationship  for the 1970s;  evidence for the U.S.  dollar between 1979 
1.  William H. Branson and James P. Love,  "The Real Exchange Rate and Employment 
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and 1985  is summarized  in figure 1, which shows the nominal  and real 
effective rates calculated  by the Federal Reserve Board.2  The correla- 
tion between the two effective rates  from 1979  through  1985  is clear. 
The point  of the evidence in figure  1  is that  movements  in the nominal 
exchange rate may have been reactions to equilibrium  adjustments  in 
real  rates.  In  this  case, a monetary  intervention  that  attempted  to stabilize 
the nominal  rate would frustrate  the movement of the real rate in the 
short run and shift the adjustment  to relative prices in the longer run. 
This is one way in which a monetary  policy that stabilized  the nominal 
exchange rate would be counterproductive.  I now turn  to the analysis 
that  indicates  that  the swing  in the real  exchange  rate of the dollar  in the 
1980s  was precisely such an equilibrium  reaction. 
Fiscal Policy and the Real Exchange Rate 
To establish the relationship  between real disturbances  and equilib- 
rium  adjustment  of the real exchange  rate, in this section I summarize  a 
short-run  "fundamentals"  model of fiscal policy and the real exchange 
rate.3 The model is a framework  for analysis that integrates goods 
markets  and asset markets  to describe simultaneous  determination  of 
the interest rate and the exchange rate. It is a short-run  model in the 
sense that  the  existing  stock  of assets is taken  as  given;  it is afundamentals 
model  because  it  focuses on  the  underlying  macroeconomic  determinants 
of movements  in rates, about  which the market  will form  expectations. 
The framework  is useful because it makes it possible to distinguish 
between  such  external  events as shifts  in the budget  position  (the  deficit), 
shifts  in international  asset demands  (the safe haven  effect), and  changes 
in  tax law  or  financial  regulation  on the  basis  of their  differing  implications 
for movements in the interest rate and the exchange rate. I begin with 
2. Jacob A. Frenkel, "Flexible Exchange Rates, Prices, and the Role of 'News': 
Lessons from  the 1970's,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 89 (August  1981),  pp. 665- 
705. 
3. The model  is laid  out in detail  in William  H. Branson,  "Causes  of Appreciation  and 
Volatility  of the Dollar," in Federal  Reserve Bank of Kansas City, The U.S. Dollar- 
Recent  Developments,  Outlook,  and Policy  Options  (FRBKC,  1985), pp.  33-52.  The 
rational  expectations  extension  is in William  H. Branson,  Arminio  Fraga,  and  Robert  A. 
Johnson, "Expected Fiscal Policy and the Recession of 1982," Working  Paper 1784 
(National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  December  1985). William H. Branson  181 
the national  income, or flow-of-funds,  identity that constrains  flows in 
the economy, then  turn  to asset-market  equilibrium  that  constrains  rates 
of return,  and  finally  bring  the two together  in figure  2. 
The national  income identity  is generally  written  as 
Y =  C + I + G + X =  C + S +  T, 
where Y =  gross national  product 
C  =  consumer expenditure 
I  =  gross private  domestic  investment 
G =  government  purchases  of goods and services 
X  =  net exports of goods and services, 
or the current  account  balance 
S  =  gross private domestic  saving 
T  =  tax revenue. 
All flows are in real terms. Subtracting  consumer  expenditure,  C, from 
both sides of the right-hand  equality  and rearranging  to obtain a useful 
version  of the flow-of-funds  identity  yields: 
(1)  G-T=  (S-I)-X. 
In terms of national income and product flows, equation 1 says the 
combined federal, state, and local government  deficit must equal the 
sum of the excess of domestic private saving over investment  less net 
exports. 
Thinking  of equation 1 as holding  at a standardized  full-employment 
level of output  excludes cyclical effects from  the discussion  and  focuses 
on shifts  in the budget  at a given level of national  income. If a shift  in the 
full-employment  fiscal  deficit,  G -  T, is taken  as external,  or exogenous 
to the economy, equation 1 emphasizes that this shift requires some 
endogenous  adjustment  to excess private  saving,  (S -  I), and  the current 
account,  X, to balance  the flows in income and  product.  In particular,  if 
G -  Tis increased  $200  billion,  roughly  the actual  annual  increase  in the 
structural  deficit,  a combination  of an increase  in (S -  1) and  a decrease 
in X that  also totals $200  billion  is required. 
According to standard  macroeconomic  theory, at a given level of 
national  income, (S -  I) depends  positively on the real interest  rate, r, 182  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
Figure 2.  Financial Market Equilibrium 




Real exchange rate 
and X depends positively on the real exchange rate, e (units of foreign 
exchange  per  dollar  adjusted  for  relative  price  levels). So the endogenous 
adjustments  that  would increase (S -  1) and  reduce  X are increases in r 
and e.  Some combination  of these changes would restore balance in 
equation 1, given an increase in G -  T. 
This national income view of the adjustment  mechanism can be 
expressed  in terms  of foreign  borrowing  and  capital  flows by noting  that 
net exports,  X, are  net foreign  investment  (from  the balance  of payments William  H. Branson  183 
identity). Since national net foreign investment is minus national net 
foreign  borrowing,  NFB,  equation  1 can also be written  as 
(2)  G-T=  (S-I)  +  NFB. 
This form  of the identity  emphasizes  that an increase  in the deficit  must 
be financed  either  by an increase in the excess of domestic saving  or by 
an  increase  in net  foreign  borrowing  (decrease  in net  foreign  investment). 
The actual  movements  in the deficit,  domestic saving,  and  net foreign 
investment,  and  the associated  movements  in the real  short-term  interest 
rate and the real exchange rate are shown in table 2. The combined 
federal, state, and local government  deficit  was slightly  over $14 billion 
at the beginning  of 1981. It expanded to a peak of $167 billion in the 
bottom of the recession in the fourth  quarter  of 1982, and then shrank 
during  the recovery. But the shift in the federal  budget  position left the 
total  government  deficit  at over $150  billion  in mid-1985,  after  two years 
of recovery. Initially  the deficit was financed  mainly by net domestic 
saving,  which also peaked  at the bottom  of the recession. But since 1982 
the fraction  financed  by net foreign borrowing  has risen; by mid-1985 
most of the government  deficit  was financed  by foreign  borrowing. 
The movements in the real interest rate and the real exchange rate 
roughly  reflect this pattern  of financing.  The real interest rate  jumped 
from negative values in 1979 to more than 6 percent in 1982, then 
fluctuated  around 5 percent until early 1985. The real exchange rate 
jumped sharply  from late 1980 to mid-1982,  then rose more gradually 
through  mid-1984  before accelerating  to its peak in 1985.  The standard 
lags in adjustment  of net exports to changes in the exchange rate can 
explain  the slow reaction  of net exports, or net foreign  borrowing,  to the 
dollar  appreciation. 
The  relationship  between  the  real  interest  rate,  r, and  the  real  exchange 
rate, e, that is imposed by financial  market  equilibrium  can be seen by 
considering  the returns  that a representative  U.S. asset holder obtains 
on domestic and  foreign  assets of the same maturity.  The return  on the 
domestic asset is i in nominal terms and r =  i -  P in real terms, where 
P is the exogenous expected rate of inflation. The nominal foreign 
interest  rate  is i*, and  the return  on the foreign  asset is i* -  e in nominal 
terms, where e is the expected rate of change in the exchange rate. In 
real terms the U.S.  asset holder's return would be i*  -  e  -  P.  In 
equilibrium,  the difference  between  the two returns  must  be equal  to the 184  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1986 
Table 2.  Saving and Investment Flows, Interest Rates, and Exchange Rates, 
United States, 1979:1-1985:4 
Billions  of dollars unless  otherwise  specified 
Federal  Real  Real 
Excess  Total  deficit  interest  exchange 
Net foreign  domestic  budget  (percent  rate  rate index 
Period  investmenta  savingsb  deficitc  of GNP)  (percent)d  (1980  =  100)e 
1979:1  6.9  -6.2  20.7  0.4  -  1.0  93.4 
1979:2  -0.8  -  15.8  -  18.5  0.2  -4.3  97.7 
1979:3  5.7  -8.5  -8.1  0.8  -3.7  96.7 
1979:4  -  1.5  -5.9  1.5  1.1  -  1.5  99.7 
1980:1  1.4  -2.8  12.1  1.4  -  3.4  101.4 
1980:2  13.4  48.0  41.9  2.4  -4.6  101.7 
1980:3  29.2  74.6  48.6  2.7  1.5  97.7 
1980:4  8.0  45.8  35.5  2.4  1.8  99.1 
1981:1  17.4  23.3  14.6  1.6  3.0  103.6 
1981:2  6.0  15.5  14.8  1.7  6.3  111.0 
1981:3  6.6  28.4  26.2  2.0  3.4  117.5 
1981:4  12.3  72.9  63.1  3.1  5.1  115.1 
1982:1  7.3  88.1  76.0  3.5  9.1  119.8 
1982:2  16.5  93.3  77.7  3.6  7.0  124.5 
1982:3  -  12.3  113.5  122.5  5.0  2.0  127.7 
1982:4  -  15.4  144.6  166.8  6.3  6.4  128.5 
1983:1  3.6  155.0  150.0  5.8  7.8  124.1 
1983:2  -28.2  91.3  123.8  5.1  4.1  125.2 
1983:3  -47.0  84.3  127.0  5.2  4.9  126.6 
1983:4  -  59.0  64.4  122.3  5.1  4.6  129.0 
1984:1  -  65.5  25.5  93.8  4.3  4.1  130.4 
1984:2  -  93.9  5.3  97.3  4.4  6.2  131.6 
1984:3  -  94.3  20.9  116.0  4.7  6.5  139.4 
1984:4  -  110.4  24.1  126.9  5.0  5.1  144.7 
1985:1  -76.8  20.1  99.4  4.2  5.0  152.4 
1985:2  -  105.8  50.8  151.9  5.3  3.4  146.1 
1985:3  -  126.2  15.7  144.5  5.0  4.6  137.5 
1985:4  -  152.5  13.5  168.0  5.6  2.9  127.3 
Sources: U.S.  Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis, The National Income and Product 
Accounts  of  the  United  States,  1929-1982  Statistical  Tables,  table 5.1  (Government  Printing Office,  forthcoming); 
Survey of Current Business,  vol.  66 (March 1986); International Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics, 
various  issues; and data  from  the Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System  and the U.S. Department  of 
Labor,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics. 
a. Net foreign  investment  in the national  income  accounts  summed  with the national  capital  grants  received  by 
the United  States. 
b. Gross  private  domestic  saving  minus  gross private  domestic  investment. 
c.  Combined  federal,  state, and  local budget  deficit. 
d. Three-month  Treasury  bill rate minus  the change  in the consumer  price  index. 
e. Index  of relative  unit  labor  costs computed  by the IMF. William  H. Branson  185 
market-determined  risk premium,  p(B),  where p is the risk premium  on 
dollar-denominated  bonds and  B is the outstanding  stock of government 
debts. Here it is assumed that dollar-denominated  bonds are imperfect 
substitutes for foreign-exchange-denominated  bonds, so that the risk 
premium  on dollar bonds increases with their supply: p'(B) >  0. The 
equilibrium  condition  for rates of return  in real  terms  is then 
(3)  r -  (i*  -  e'-P)  =  p(B). 
Next, the expected rate of change of the exchange rate is related  to 
the actual current  rate. If the perceived long-run  equilibrium  real rate 
that  sets the full-employment  current  account  balance  at zero is denoted 
as e, one reasonable  assumption  is that the current  rate is expected to 
return  gradually  toward  long-run  equilibrium.  This assumption  can be 
written  as a proportional  adjustment  mechanism: 
(4)  e =  (e  -  e). 
If e is below the long-run  equilibrium,  it is expected to rise, and vice 
versa. Putting  equation  4 into the equilibrium  condition,  equation  3, and 
rearranging  a bit, yields the financial-market  relationship  between e and 
r: 
(5)  e  =  e +  -[r  -  (*  P)  -  p(B)]. 
0 
This  condition  says that  forgiven  values  of the bond  stock,  B, inflation, 
P, the foreign  nominal  interest  rate, i*, and  the long-run  equilibrium  real 
exchange rate, e,  an increase in r requires a rise in e to maintain 
equilibrium  in financial  markets. Why? If the home interest rate rises, 
equilibrium  can  be maintained  for  a given  foreign  rate  only  if the  exchange 
rate is expected to fall. From equation  4, the actual current  rate must 
rise  to establish  e < 0. In terms  of market  operations,  the rise in domestic 
interest rates, r,  causes  sales of foreign assets  and exchange rate 
appreciation  until equilibrium  is reestablished.  This is essentially what 
happened  in 1981  with  the announcement  of a path  of future  U.S. deficits. 
The expected  deficit  path  did  not substantially  change  the long-run  e that 
would  balance  the current  account, but it did move r and e. 
The flow equilibrium  condition, equation 1, and the rate-of-return 
condition,  equation  5, can be  joined to form  the short-run  framework  for 186  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1986 
simultaneous  determination  of r and  e. Rewriting  equation  1  to show the 
dependence  of S and  I on r and of X on e gives: 
(6)  G -  T=  S(r) -  (r)  -  X(e). 
For a given level of the full-employment  budget,  the trade-off  between r 
and e that maintains  flow equilibrium  is given by the negatively  sloped 
IX curve in figure  2. For a given G -  T, an increase  in r, which reduces 
(S -  1), requires  a decrease in e, which increases X, to maintain  flow 
equilibrium.  An increase in G -  T will shift the IX curve up or to the 
right, requiring  some combination  of a rise in r and e to maintain  flow 
equilibrium. 
The rate-of-return  condition, equation  5, gives the positively sloped 
FM curve in figure  2, for given  B, i*, P, and e. Its slope is 0, the speed- 
of-adjustment  parameter  for expectations. An increase in the risk pre- 
mium, p, due to a rise in the supply  of U.S. bonds, B, will shift the FM 
curve up and to the left, requiring  an increase in r for any given value 
of e. 
In the short  run, equilibrium  r and  e are reached  at the intersection  of 
IX and  FM in figure  2; there, both equilibrium  conditions are met. For 
the purposes  of the analysis  here, the assumption  is that  initially  e = e, 
with  no expected movement  in exchange  rates. This  is taken  to represent 
the equilibrium  around 1980, before the surge in interest rates and the 
exchange  rate  in question. 
A shift in the full-employment,  or structural,  budget toward deficit 
shifts the IX curve up, as shown by the dashed  IX curve in figure  2. The 
real interest rate and the real exchange rate rise, as described  earlier. 
The composition  of these movements  is determined  by the slope of the 
FM curve, representing  financial  market  equilibrium.  The movement  of 
r and  e from  Eo  to El raises excess domestic  saving, (S -  I), and  reduces 
net exports, X, by a sum equal  to the shift  in G -  T. This also produces 
the short-run  equilibrium  financing  of the shift  in the deficit  by domestic 
saving and foreign  investment.  The results of the shift in G -  T are the 
movements in excess domestic saving and foreign investment  and in r 
and e that are shown in table 2. Thus the framework  of figure  2 roughly 
captures  the movements  of r and e from 1981  to 1985. 
The object of this section is to show that  a shift  in fiscal  policy, much 
as occurred  beginning  in 1982,  will generate  an equilibrium  adjustment 
in the real  exchange  rate  as part  of the financing  process. This movement William H. Branson  187 
is probably being reversed now, as the Gramm-Rudman  legislation 
brings  real  interest  rates  and  the exchange  rate  down. A monetary  policy 
that  attempted  to frustrate  this movement  probably  would be a mistake 
now, as it would have been in 1982. It would not productively  reduce 
the fluctuations  in the nominal  exchange  rate. 
Any agreement  on coordination  of monetary  policy or on targeting 
monetary  policy on the nominal  exchange rate would have to allow for 
the effects of real disturbances  such as shifts in fiscal policy on the 
equilibrium  real exchange rate. The analysis here places the responsi- 
bility  for the real appreciation  of the dollar  squarely  on the shift  in fiscal 
policy. However, as noted, there is currently no consensus on the 
analysis  of these effects. 
In fact, the level of disagreement  on the analysis  makes a meaningful 
formal agreement on monetary coordination virtually impossible. A 
loose form  of central  bank  coordination  may be useful to smooth  out the 
volatility  of exchange rates. But coordination  on targeting  is not going 
to eliminate  the broad swings in equilibrium  real rates that have been 
labeled "misalignment,"  and should  not be attempted. 
A New Bretton Woods? 
The 1944 Bretton Woods conference essentially ratified a United 
States-United Kingdom agreement  on monetary coordination.  Its 44 
signatories  met in a context of analytical  consensus and agreement  on 
the need to  stabilize exchange rates to prevent a repetition of the 
competitive  devaluations  of the 1930s.  No such  consensus  about  analysis 
or objectives exists today, and a conference  would have twice as many 
members.  There  would  be a larger  number  of significant  economic  actors 
and  a seeming  infinity  of potential  blocking  coalitions. 
A better model for a new monetary  conference might  be the World 
Economic  Conference  of 1933,  in which objectives were in conflict  and 
the analytical understanding  of  the relationship between exchange 
stabilization  and  national  objectives  was at  best limited.  That  conference 
failed  because  of a conflict  between  American  and  European  objectives, 
as summarized  by Kenneth  A. Oye: 
At the Conference,  Roosevelt considered  ajoint French  and  British  proposal  for 
temporary  currency stabilization,  and instructed  the American  delegation to 188  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
seek agreement  on ever higher  dollar/sterling  rates. When  one of the American 
offers  was accepted, Roosevelt simply  withdrew  the offer. 
Why did the United States reject the joint proposal?  The concessions offered 
were simply  not commensurate  with the concession sought, a currency  stabili- 
zation  that Roosevelt believed would  vitiate domestic  reflation.  In fact, rumors 
of the impending  stabilization  agreement  had triggered  a sharp  decline in stock 
and commodity prices. This may have reinforced  Roosevelt's views on the 
desirability  of further  dollar  depreciation.4 
A similar absence  of analytical consensus  and conflict of economic 
interests makes a major monetary conference  now a likely failure. Let 
the central banks do the coordination  and the National  Science  Foun- 
dations of the world finance research on the analysis. 
APPENDIX 
Estimates of the Sensitivity of Employment 
to the Real Exchange Rate 
INITIAL RESULTS  from  an  empirical  investigation  of  the  relationship 
between  movements  in the  real exchange  rate and employment  and 
output for U. S. manufacturing industries are reported in a recent working 
paper that I coauthored  with James P.  Love.5  Here  I summarize  the 
employment results by industry and by state. In this research, we have 
not modeled each industry or state individually, taking into account the 
special demand shocks and price effects that may be important. Rather, 
we  have  constructed  general reduced-form models  that apply to each 
disaggregated sector or state. 
The dependent variable in the regressions  is the natural logarithm of 
total employment.  The independent  variables  include  a constant,  the 
natural logarithm of an index to measure the real U.S.  trade-weighted 
exchange rate, and three variables to capture secular and cyclical changes 
in demand: time, the natural logarithm of an index to measure the real 
4.  Kenneth  A. Oye, "The  Sterling-Dollar-Franc  Triangle:  Monetary  Diplomacy  1929- 
37,"  World  Politics,  vol. 38 (October 1985), p. 186. 
5. Branson  and  Love, "The  Real Exchange  Rate." William  H. Branson  189 
price of energy, and the natural  logarithm  of the overall  unemployment 
rate. We considered the inclusion of a foreign demand variable, but 
found that deviations from trend growth in foreign demand were so 
highly correlated with changes in U.S.  demand that no additional 
explanatory  power came from  foreign  demand. 
The data are quarterly.  The equations  are estimated  from 1963:1  to 
1985:1, with in general eighty-nine observations. The exchange rate 
variable  includes the current  value plus six quarters  of lags. The real 
energy  price and  the unemployment  rate both include  the current  value 
plus four  quarters  of lags. The estimates  employ the Beach-MacKinnon 
maximum  likelihood procedure  for correcting  first-order  autocorrela- 
tion.6 
The source  of the data  on employment  is various  issues of the Bureau 
of Labor  Statistics  '  Employment andEarnings.  In  the  regional  equations, 
we use the number  of workers employed in manufacturing  industries, 
disaggregated  by the fifty states plus the District of Columbia.  In the 
industry  classifications,  we use the number  of workers  employed  in each 
of the twenty industries  with two-digit  standard  industrial  classification 
(SIC) codes. To test how sensitive the estimates are to changes in the 
level of aggregation  we have estimated  equations  for all 125  of the three- 
digit manufacturing  code industries and all 176 four-digit  industries 
included  in the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  Establishment  Survey  tape. 
The real exchange rate index is the International  Monetary  Fund's 
measure  of the weighted  foreign  exchange value of the dollar,  adjusted 
for movements  in relative unit labor costs. The measure  is reported  in 
the relative  cost tables in International Financial  Statistics and is taken 
to represent  movement  in U.S. costs relative  to those of major  compet- 
itors. An increase  in the index represents  a real  appreciation  of the U.S. 
dollar. 
The results are  reported  by industry  in table A-  I and  by state in table 
A-2. The tables report the value of  the first-order  autocorrelation 
coefficient,  the coefficients  for each of the independent  variables  except 
for  the constant,  and  a significance  statistic.  When  independent  variables 
are lagged, the coefficient  represents  the sum of all lagged  coefficients. 
6. Charles  M. Beach  and  James  G. MacKinnon,  "A Maximum  Likelihood  Procedure 
for Regression  with Autocorrelated  Errors,"  Econometrica,  vol. 46 (January  1978),  pp. 
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The significance  measure is the probability  that the true value of the 
coefficient  is zero, using a two-tailed  t test. The coefficient  for the time 
variable is  the estimated exponential rate of  growth or decline in 
employment  (wages or output)  that occurs because of secular changes 
in taste, comparative  advantage,  or technology. The coefficients  on the 
real exchange rate, the real price of energy, and the employment  ratio 
can be interpreted  as elasticities. 
In table A-1, the coefficient of the real exchange rate variable is 
negative  for sixteen of twenty industries  and significant  at the 0.05 level 
for eleven industries. Within  the nondurable  goods industries, textile 
mill products, apparel  and other textile goods, and petroleum  and coal 
products are negative and significant  at the 0.05 level. Somewhat less 
significant  but showing important  negative effects are chemicals and 
allied  products,  rubber  and miscellaneous  plastic products,  and leather 
and leather  goods. The coefficient  for the print  and publishing  industry 
is significant  and  positive. 
The durable  goods sector has seven industries  with a negative  coeffi- 
cient for the real exchange rate that is significant  at the 0.01 level, 
including stone, clay, and glass products, primary metal products, 
fabricated metal products, nonelectrical machinery, transportation 
equipment,  instruments  and related  products, and miscellaneous  man- 
ufacturing.  Coefficients  for lumber  and wood products, furniture  and 
fixtures, and electrical  and electronic equipment  are positive but small 
and not statistically  significant. 
The results by state are shown in table A-2, sorted by the size of the 
exchange rate coefficient. The coefficient  is significant  at the 0.01 level 
for thirty-five  states, and  at the 0.05 level for thirty-eight  states. The sign 
is negative for forty-six states, including  all in which it is significant  at 
the 0.05 level. The elasticity of employment with respect to the real 
exchange  rate  in the "Rust Belt" states runs  from - 0.45 in Michigan  to 
- 0.23 in Pennsylvania.  There are four states at the bottom of the list 
with insignificant  positive coefficients. The service-oriented  District of 
Columbia  has the only significantly  positive coefficient. 